Trading in Influence: Modus Baru dalam Korupsi Indonesia Tahun 2022 dan Paradoks Kriminalisasi

This study evaluates the handling of corruption cases by the Prosecutor's Office, the Police and the Corruption Eradication Commission throughout 2022 and gives a fair grade (C) with a handling percentage of about 50% of the target of 2,772 cases. A comparative assessment of the last five years illustrates the dynamics of the handling of corruption cases. Quantitative charts highlight trends in enforcement, from the number of cases to potential losses to the state. Mapping corruption cases using the influence peddling mode involves identifying, analyzing, and summarizing patterns. Mapping steps include identification of cases, analysis of characteristics, creation of visual maps, integration of contextual factors, trend analysis, and recommendations. This mapping supports the understanding and formulation of strategies for dealing with corruption cases using the influence trading mode. In 2022, budget abuse dominates, followed by price gouging and fictitious activities. The high prevalence of these three methods indicates a lack of oversight in development and widespread corruption in the procurement of goods and services. Of the 579 cases, 43% involved the procurement of goods and services. Influence trading methods were also identified and used 19 times. The delegation of great authority to regional heads creates bargaining in the promotion and transfer of ASN. The case of buying and selling positions involving Regional Heads and ASN reflects the symbiosis between the two, with greed for power and ASN's desire to obtain immediate positions. The rise in this case is likened to an iceberg phenomenon, with the possibility that many cases have yet to be discovered.

Pakistans Post 9/11, Afghan Policy: Prospects and Challenges 2001-2014

Pakistan after 11thSeptember, 2001 changed its policy of supporting Taliban Government in Afghanistan and joined US led Global War on Terror. US military action in Afghanistan started in October 2001; this operation pushed the militants and operatives of Al-Qaida from Afghanistan into Pakistan’s Tribal Areas. Thus, turning it into a safe sanctuary for foreign militants and also provided base for Al-Qaeda and Afghan Taliban, these militants used the porous Pak-Afghan border to attack US and Western forces in Afghanistan. Though Pakistan became a close ally of US and its allies in GWOT in Afghanistan and was given the status of a “major non-NATO ally” for its important role in supporting US forces to get hold of Al-Qaida and its supporters. However, Afghan government (established in 2001 in Bonn Conference), Western and international community began to blame Pakistan for allowing and supporting militant groups and for encouraging cross-border attacks. This mistrust ruined Pakistan’s relations with Afghanistan. India subsequently took advantage of situation and became a major actor in Afghanistan through investing and rebuilding projects and started growing its economic and political influence in Afghanistan. Pakistan’s post 9/11 Afghan policy designed to protect Pakistan from any external threat perception and supported Afghanistan politically, financially and hosted millions of Afghan refugees but despite these efforts distrust between both the neighbours, Pakistan and Afghanistan and excessive Indian presence in Afghanistan was a major strategic defeat for Pakistan. It gave rise to security threat perception of Pakistan in its neighbour hood which it always wanted to counter. The flaws in Pakistan’s Policies in responding to the militancy post 9/11 are its entire dependence on the hard options and neglecting peace inside the state. This thesis develops its argument for the appropriate approach to the regional and internal security of Pakistan. This Thesis also shows to embrace the solutions for eliminating the root cause of militancy and extremism on which terrorism feeds and grows.