المیول الی التطرف الدینی العصری فی الدول الاسلامیة والغربیة: الاسباب و معالجتها فی ضوء السیرۃ

That is the discussion about “The attitudes (inclinations) towards causes : modern religious extremism in Islamic and western countries and it’s treatment” is not a new topic for us, when we look into the history, there are lot of discussions and debates and the other things are carried out in all over the world and there are lot of solutions which have been solved through the discussions and certain rules have been found after their discussions. This article overviews Islamic, religious, historical, social aspects and also has about the attitudes (inclinations) towards modern religious extremism in Islamic and western countries: causes and its treatment”, this article grapes the reality in the light of Quran and Sunnah (SAW). The religious extremism is the dark darkness that pervades the world today in its blackness, in the world, and religious extremism exists in all religions, but especially in the heavenly religions. Where religious extremism means the extremism of a person or group of a certain faiths or even of a particular dogma. Religious extremism is almost the most important concern for the people at present.

Effect of Explicit Deposit Insurance on Moral Hazard of Banks Risk-Taking: in Cross Section of Supervision

The adoption of explicit deposit insurance increases the moral hazard of bank’s risktaking triggered by the reduction in depositors’ discipline. In the light of economic and contract theories, the main objectives of this study are; to analyze whether the implementation of risk-adjusted deposit insurance premium shrinks the bank’s risktaking, to examine that the allocation of appropriate supervisory powers and suitable supervision structure to a banking supervisor reduces the bank’s risk-taking, to scrutinize whether to allocate the additional supervisory power to a deposit insurer in the presence of banking supervisor which more likely to decreases the moral hazard of bank’s risk-taking. This study comprises the secondary data of publically traded deposit-taking banks of 125 countries from 2002 to 2014 period. In this scenario, the bank-level data is collected from the Bankscope database while country-level data is collected from the surveys of World Bank and global financial development database. This study uses the Hierarchical Linear Modelling (HLM) technique which takes into account the nested effect of the dataset. The findings reveal that enactment of risk-adjusted deposit insurance premium decreases the moral hazard of bank’s risk-taking initiated by the adoption of explicit deposit insurance. Though, this effect is higher for the small banks as compared to large banks. Furthermore, the allocation of greater supervisory powers to a banking supervisor, reduces the moral hazard of bank’s risk-taking in non-crisis affected countries and uplifts the financial health of banks in both crisis and non-crisis affected countries. Moreover, a central bank with greater supervisory powers, appears to mitigate the moral hazard of bank’s risk-taking adopted by explicit deposit insurance. Whereas, the allocation of low supervisory powers to a central bank has a little or no impact on the bank’s risk-taking. The allocation of supervisory powers to a deposit insurer decreases the moral hazard of bank’s risk-taking and enriches the bank’s soundness in non-crisis effected countries. Furthermore, the allocation of additional supervisory powers to a deposit insurer, appears as the additional force to mitigate the moral hazard of bank’s risk-taking in the presence of a banking supervisor. However, this effect is more significant in non-crisisaffected countries. Therefore, the regulatory institutes can reform their strategies and surveillance policies under the verdicts of this study, as it intensifies the depositors and investors’ confidence in the banking system around the globe.