اس قدر نقصان ہوتے جا رہے ہیں
ہم تہی دامان ہوتے جا رہے ہیں
یوں خطا اوسان ہوتے جا رہے ہیں
لوگ سب حیران ہوتے جا رہے ہیں
زندگی بے کیف ہوتی جا رہی ہے
درد بے درمان ہوتے جا رہے ہیں
تیرے جانے سے لگا کچھ یوں کہ ہم
بے سر و سامان ہوتے جا رہے ہیں
درد کی دولت اکٹھی کر رہے ہیں
ہم بھی تو سلطان ہوتے جا رہے ہیں
کچھ نشانے پر ہیں اب صیاد کے
کچھ پسِ زندان ہوتے جا رہے ہیں
جزبۂ احساس مرتا جا رہا ہے
شہر قبرستان ہوتے جا رہے ہیں
جو تھے میری جان تائبؔ جی کبھی
اب وہ بارِ جان ہوتے جا رہے ہیں
Aims of Study: Planter fasciitis (PF) is a common cause of heel pain. Muscle energy technique (METs) and passive soft tissue therapies are widely used for its management. The objective of this review was to evaluate the comparative effectiveness of METs and passive soft tissue therapies on PF.
Methodology: An extensive electronic literature search was made using different databases and search engines. Studies regarding METs and soft tissues therapies were investigated according to the eligibility criteria, using extracted data form and assessed for risk of bias. Outcome measures were pain and functional status. Quality assessment was done with Downs and Black, Cochrane risk of bias tool, PEDro scale and Critical Appraisal Skill Program (CASP) tool.
Results: Five articles met the selection criteria, were systematically reviewed for quantitative synthesis on comparative effects of METs and passive soft tissue therapies on PF. The quality of studies was moderate to high.
Limitations and Future Implications: Less evidence on desired interventions and outcome measures was the limitation. Relative efficacy helps in clinical decision making and improve patient’s related outcomes.
Originality: This review is the independent creation of authors.
Conclusion: Manual soft tissue techniques are more effective than METs on improving pain and function in planter fasciitis.
This dissertation studies the impact of corporate ownership structure on dividend payout and firm performance. The dissertation ties these variables to test whether policy intervention with respect to blockholding and higher managerial ownership is required in Pakistan. This dissertation develops and tests two main hypotheses about insiders’ ownership in listed firms. The first hypothesis is related to finding evidence of expropriation of minority shareholders by insiders whereas the second hypothesis is related to quantification of the expropriation effects on firm value. In the first part, this dissertation posits that the relevance and indeed the assumptions of the dividends cost minimization model ought to be restricted to those countries where shareholders rights are well protected. Alternatively, this study proposes an “investor power” hypothesis, which is closely akin to the La Porta et al.’s (2000) “outcome hypothesis”. The investor power hypothesis states that the determining factor of dividends payout in a weak legal system is not the minimization of agency costs; instead it is the presence of certain powerful outside investors who can force firms to pay out dividends. Using two variants of the dividends cost minimization model and a modified version of the dividends partial adjustment model on a data set for 183 Pakistani listed firms, the empirical results partially support the investor power hypothesis. Results of the mean-comparison tests as well as the regression models show that dividend-payout ratio decreases with the ownership percentage of individual shareholders and the incumbent managers. The empirical results indicate that there is only weak evidence that institutional investors can force managers to pay dividends. Among the other variables, dividend payout ratio increases with the size of a firm and ownership percentage of associated companies, and decreases with financial leverage, coefficient of variation of net income, and growth opportunities. In the second part, the dissertation hypothesizes that the market places expropriation premium on the stocks of the firms where large insiders are present. In addition to poor market performance, such firms are expected to show poor accounting performance due to various forms of expropriations. These hypotheses are tested with the help of OLS (ordinary least square) and 2SLS (two-stage least square) regressions while controlling for other explanatory variables that have been identified in the literature. The results indicate that both the market- and accounting- based measures of performance are negatively related to the ownership percentage of incumbent managers. Among the control variables, Tobin’s Q increases with growth opportunities and tangibility of assets, whereas it decreases with firm size, market risk, firm-specific risk, and ownership percentage of institutional shareholders.