Conflicting interests of minority and majority shareholders in concentrated firms entice severe illegal tunneling. Tunneling is siphoning of firm’s resources by the controlling shareholders for their private benefits at the cost of minority shareholders. This consequently inflicts losses to minority shareholders, discourages investors and affects the entire firm''s operations. This study aims to examine determinants of tunneling in the non-financial concentrated firms and to predict the short and long run association of influential factors. Study is relying on the secondary panel data collected during 2000 to 2015. Firm’s annual report, Pakistan Stock Exchange and State Bank of Pakistan were used as data sources. Using Fixed Effect Model andARDL, results show that except executive compensation, all are statistically significant using inter-corporate loan as proxy for tunneling. Similarly, all the factors are statistically significant using cash dividend as proxy for tunneling. Results also present that these factors show a significant effect in association with tunneling for short and long run confirmed through ARDL. Theoretically, this study contributes to agency theory and economic theory of crime. While, practically the study contributes to investors, owners and regulatory institutions of the market. Findings of the study share thorough information to investors which may help them for better portfolio decision. Additionally, study also apprise a vast array of stakholders of the firms about the severity of the tunneling and its deep rooted impairments to entire firm’s operations. Recommendations of the study guide regulatory infrastructure of the market to establish and implement rules for shareholders’ protection, encourage investment and harness transparent business environemnts.