الشعر في ميزان القرآن الحكيم

The Holy Qur’ān is said to be a book neither in poetry nor in prose; yet it has a unique rhyme with a metrical system peculiar to it. The science of prosody and metrics, which is linked directly to poetry with its two characteristics of meter and rhyme, is based on the inductive study of the formal qualities of the Arabic poetry. The Holy Qur’ān, though not a book of poetry, is far away from the stylistics of prosaic speech in the sense since the terminal-end points of the ayaths (verses) of its each and every surah are rhythmic and follow a metrical system of its own, which phenomenon is significant from the view- point of the science of prosody and metrics. Given this, each and every Surah of Qur’ān has a distinct quality whereby it can be recognized and differentiated from every other surah. Both Islam and the Qur’ān have abstained from going to the extent of putting an end to poetic genius; rather they have encouraged it differentiating good poetry meant for the cause of spreading Islamic message from the bad one that stands against the message of Islam.  As regards the Qur’ān, its each and every Surah is dominated by multi-dimensional musical rhythms in synchrony with the total climate of its verses, which makes the listener spell-bound, and which plays an essential function so characteristic of the science of eloquent rhetoric.

Corporate Governance, Product Market Competition, Corporate Diversification and Value of Cash Holding

The purpose of this research is to investigate effect of corporate governance on different facets of cash management i-e, level of cash holding, value of cash holding, utilization of excess cash and performance. Furthermore, the role of product market competition is checked in the relationship of corporate governance with different facets of cash management and to get more detail analysis role of family ownership and Shariah compliance is also checked. The research also investigated effect of corporate diversification on value of cash holding in strong governed firms and poorly governed firms; competitive and concentrated industries; family and non-family firms; Shariah and non-Shariah compliant firms. The study used unbalanced panel data of 196 companies from the years 2006 to 2014. All models generally include time dummies and industry fixed effect with standard error cluster to firm. The result shows that corporate governance has significant negative effect on corporate cash holding which supports flexibility hypothesis. Moreover, corporate governance has significant positive effect on value of cash holding and performance of firm through efficient utilization of excess cash due to corporate governance. The role of product market competition is explained in the context of substitution and complementary effect argument. The results generally support complementary effect of product market competition for corporate governance in all relationship with cash management and performance except with level of cash holding that support substitution effect. Substitution effect claim that external market discipline alone is enough mitigate agency problem. On the other hand, complementary hypothesis claim that external market discipline need efficient internal governance to mitigate agency problem. Family firms have high agency problem compared to non-family firms and corporate governance leads to proper utilization of excess cash that leads to high value of cash holding and performance in family firms. The dissertation also investigated effect of corporate governance on different facets of cash management in Shariah compliant firms and nonShariah compliant firms. The result portray that corporate governance has no significant effect on level of cash holding. The result postulates insignificant effect on value of cash holding and utilization of excess cash in Shariah compliant firms which support substitution effect of Shariah compliance for corporate governance. Excess cash under good governance has same effect on performance in Shariah and non-Shariah compliant firms and the result does not support agency theory. The result also indicates that corporate diversification decreases value of cash holding due to agency problem. However, it increases value of cash holding in good governed firms compared to poorly governed firms. Similarly, it increases value of cash holding in competitive industries compared to concentrated industries because external market discipline mitigate agency problem. On the other hand, corporate diversification decreases value of cash holding in family firms, while it has significant effect on value of cash holding in Shariah compliant firms.