This study focuses on the failure of state and democracy building experiment in the post-Taliban Afghanistan. The aforementioned experiment is the first test case of militarized intervention after 9/11 under the banner of the war on terrorism to build a failed state on liberal democratic lines. This dissertation includes an in-depth study of the processes and their nexus to give a broader theoretical understanding of the failure of the experiment in the transitory phase. The sources of the failure were not only located in the flawed design and an asymmetrical interaction pattern, but the challenges originated from the gaps in the processes also negatively affected the linkage between democracy and stateness. Both processes suffered from the legitimacy deficit and failed to bring transition in the institutions whilst the contradictions and ambiguities in the principal intervener‘s policies negated the spirit of liberal values in the experiment. Competing agendas of the interveners and lack of coordination among them contributed to the failure of processes. The principal intervener (U.S.) de-politicized and de-contextualized its policies to address the failed state conditions. The intervener preferred stability to democratization and facilitated narrow power-sharing arrangements. The intervener and its local allies excluded the opposition forces, mainly Taliban, and neglected the aspirations of the Afghan society in Bonn conference I. This exclusion went in favor of Tajiks, the new state elite, and thus exacerbated ethnic tensions and power struggle between Pashtuns and non-Pashtuns. The processes, therefore, created a fragile state with weak and dependent institutions. Lack of accountability and public participation made these institutions fragile and provided the new and old state elites with an opportunity to nurture their patronage networks. This is why the post-U.S. Afghanistan appears engulfed with insurgency and violence, which have increased civilian casualties. Violence continues to dominate the Afghan domestic politics whereas the coercive, capital, and administrative capacities of the Afghan state remain limited and confined to major provincial capitals. Pervasive corruption in the state institutions is a continuing trend with no signs of reduction. The incumbent [unity] government, a product of an intra-elite bargain, so far appears incapable of garnering public support in its struggle against the Taliban insurgency and other turbulences in the post-Taliban Afghanistan.