The insurgency in Swat (2007 onwards) tested the ideological will of Pakistan and took a heavy toll of human life, both of civilian population and law enforcement personnel alike. The ranging course of hard way to peace in Swat is seen as natural consequence of the state’s failure in the form of bad governance, worsening social justice and deteriorating rule of law. The inability of government to devise a suitable legislation according to the needs of people led to the legal vacuum that was effectively exploited by reactionary forces. After the USSR’s eviction from Afghanistan, the Jihadists under Sufi Mohammad turned their attention towards Shariatization of Pakistan’s Swat region. In order to address the grievances of the people, the Nizam-e-Adl Regulations was imposed in 1994 and then, with some amendments, in 1999 but it failed being cosmetic in nature. The study attempts to explore the rise of insurgency in Swat in post 9/11 and Pakistan Counterinsurgency campaign which included both the kinetic operations (military approach) and non-kinetic operations (peace agreements, psychological and de-radicalization operations). The outcomes of this thesis reveal that Sharia’s cause may not have been a main driver of conflict in Swat, but the underdeveloped and outlandish judicial system and ineffective governance certainly led to the rise of Sufi Mohammad and Fazlullah as political force in the region. Taking advantage of the situation, the lower class such as peasants and tenants being socially and economically deprived joined the insurgency. Moreover, the peace agreements of 2007 and 2008 brought forth detrimental consequences, nonetheless, the 2009 peace deal in the form of Nizam-e-Adl Regulations was meaningful in nature, since it exposed the true face of militants before the people that their demand for Sharia enforcement was just an excuse to gain power. As far Pakistan Army was concerned, it was more inclined to remain a conventional Army capable of meeting any threat from India rather than to be seen as a counterinsurgency force. Military operations such as Rah-e-Haq I, II and III which were conducted from 2007 until 2009 failed due to various factors such as President Musharraf’s double standards, weak internal security policies, feeble political will, General Kayani’s indecisive military approach and lack of military training for Counterinsurgency operations. From tactical perspective, the major shortcoming of Rah-e-Haq I, II, III was military’s inability to launch successful ground operation inside Peochar valley. The findings of this thesis suggest that post April 2009 era, Pakistan military transformed its strategic culture from conventional into Counterinsurgency warfare as evident from various indicators: Massive training for guerilla operations, small mobile units operating within the population centers; settlement of the millions of displaced population, mobilization of community security through village defense committees, Lashkar and Aman committees. Over and above, Pakistan Military conducted the most challenging non-kinetic aspects of counterinsurgency; the de-radicalization. In Swat, Sabaoon is first de-radicalization center in the world for the children who had been plagued with extremists’ ideology, including those who were trained to become suicide bombers. In a nutshell, the research deconstructs Pakistan’s approach of countering the insurgency by probing both its military response as well as civilian response in the broader framework of integrated counterinsurgency approach.