This study seeks to explore the value of Corporate Governance (CG) practices in Pakistan; a market characterized with week legal investor-protection jurisdiction and concentrated ownership structures. The sample of the study consists of 200 corporate firms listed at the Karachi Stock Exchange for the period 2003 to 2014. The study further categorizes the sample in to small, medium, and large firms on the basis of their market capitalisation. First, this study seeks to explore the value relevance of firm level CG practices in Pakistan. Second, the study examines the influence of CG on the value implication of dividends. Based on the agency theory predictions, the sample of the study is split into high and low governance regimes to examine outcome and substitute agency hypothesis. Third, the study tries to empirically investigate the argument that higher CG is associated with decreased cost of capital. Finally, the study also investigates whether firm-level governance enhances the extent of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) in the annual reports. Generalized method of movement results reveal that CG plays a major role in effecting market valuation in Pakistan. The results indicate that a one unit increase in CG is associated with an increase of 0.57 in the value of Q in large Cap firms, followed by medium Cap firms (0.30), and small Cap firms (0.16). In case of joint CG and ownership effect, the results document that low CG rank firms have lower firms value as compare to high CG rank firms. The study also shows that a firm market value varies with the level of its insiders’ ownership, and the pattern of valuation differs relying jointly on CG and insiders’ ownership. The firm is rewarded with higher valuation if it has high CG but lower management ownership, however if the firm has predominant ownership but meanwhile its CG is weak, its firm value is lower. In contrast, the results suggest that the presence of a predominant shareholder adds more value to a small firm. These results imply that in a weak legal protection country such as Pakistan investors look for other indicators such as CG and insiders’ ownership as a guide for seeking additional protection for their investment. The results further documents that stronger governed firms pay higher dividends. The marginal effects presented reveal that a rise of 1 unit in CG score results in an average increase of 0.34 in pool, 0.65 in large, 0.10 in medium, and 0.12 in small Cap firm’s dividend payout ratio. The sample is further split into high and low CG to examine outcome and substitute hypothesis. The results support the outcome agency model which states that high CG ranking firms pay higher dividends than low CG firms. Furthermore, the study also tests the growth opportunities effect. The results suggest that high CG firms with better growth prospects pay lower dividend than otherwise similar firms with poor growth opportunities. On the other hand, the results indicate that weak CG firms distribute similar dividend irrespective of their growth opportunities. Further, the evidence lends support to the hypothesis that CG is an important determinant of enhancing CSR disclosures in annual reports. The results document that low CG rank firms have lower CSR disclosure as compare to high CG rank firms. The results indicate that CG alone is not sufficient to induce firms to provide more CSR information, rather both CG and ownership structure matters in influencing firms’ choice of CSR engagement. The results also show that CG and cost of capital is negatively correlated in large, medium, and small Cap firms. The result confirms the theoretical proposition of the agency theory that investors will be willing to accept a lower risk premium if firms have robust oversight mechanisms to curb managerial opportunism. In case of joint effect of CG and insider’s ownership the results reveal that investors demand lower required rate of return form high CG firms as compare to low CG firms. The results show that firms in the high CG and predominant ownership category pay higher cost of capital as compare to the high CG and low ownership category. Further, for the low CG firms the coefficient on low CG-low ownership category and low CG-predominant category is much higher as compare to high CG-low ownership category. The study also seeks to fulfill the objective about identifying factors that determines firm-level CG. The results indicate that variations in the costs and benefits of different governance practices depend on company’s monitoring and operational characteristics. Furthermore, a one-way ANOVA was conducted to determine if large, medium, and small groups differs in terms of their CG. The results document that there is a statistically significant difference in CG-score between the small Cap and medium Cap firms. Similarly, a statistically significant difference is found between the large Cap and the small Cap firms, and large Cap and medium Cap firms.
اسراء اور معراج قرآن کریم میں آیت اسراء میں من المسجدالحرام الی المسجد الاقصی کا ذکر ہے۔اسراء میں کوئی اختلاف نہیںہے یہ قرآن سے ثابت ہے۔تقریباََ تیس صحابہ کرام نے روایت کیا ہے۔اختلاف روایات کی بنیاد پر بعض سیرت نگاروں نے اسراء کا ہونا کئی بار ہوا لکھا ہے۔ایک دفعہ یہ سفر جسد مبارک اور روح مقدس کے ساتھ ہوا۔بعثت کے گیارہویں سال یا ایک روایت کے مطابق ہجرت سے ایک سال قبل معراج ہوئی۔ایک قول کے مطابق ربیع الاول اور دوسرے کے مطابق رمضان شریف اور تیسرے اور مشہور قول کے مطابق رجب میں معراج ہوئی۔ اسی قول پر لوگوں کا عمل ہے۔ مکہ سے بیت المقدس تک کے سفر کو اسراء کہتے ہیں اور وہاں سے آسمانوں کی سیر کو معراج کہتے ہیں۔ اس میں رب تعالیٰ نے آپ کو ملکوت کے عجائب دکھائے۔ارشاد خداوندی ہے ’’ لِنُریَہ مِن اٰیٰتِناَ (بنی اسرائیل۔۱) جب کہ اللہ تعالیٰ زمان و مکان سے پاک ہے۔ اس شب میں آقا کریم کو اللہ تعالیٰ نے اپنا دیدار کرایا اور بندہ خاص پر وحی کی ۔ واقعہ معراج آپؐ نے اپنی چچا زاد ام ہانی کو بتایا۔انھوں نے آپؐ کی چادر کا دامن پکڑ لیا۔عرض کی اے چچا زاد! میں آپؐ کو رب کا واسطہ دیتی ہوں کہ آپؐ قریش کو یہ واقعہ نہ بتائیں ورنہ آپؐ کی تصدیق کرنے والے بھی آپؐ کو جھٹلادیں گے۔ آپؐ نے چادر کو چھڑالیا اور ام ہانی نے کہا میں نے آپؐ کے قلب انور کے پاس ایک نور دیکھا۔قریب تھا کہ میری آنکھیں چندھیا جاتیں۔میں فوراََ سجدہ میں گر گئی۔ جب سر اٹھایا تو آپؐ جا چکے تھے۔ام ہانی نے اپنی لونڈی سے کہا جا کر دیکھو! آنحضرتﷺ ان سے کیا کہتے ہیں؟ اس نے بتایا کہ حضورؐ قریش کے اس گروہ کی طرف گئے ہیں جو حطیم میں موجود تھا۔...
Gelatin is derived from Collagen which is a natural protein in the animal’s skin and tissues like cows and pigs. So in this connection there is a doubt in its status that whether it is lawful (Halãl) or unlawful (Harãm). There are two different views about Gelatin. According to the 3rd Fiqhi Conference held in Makka al Mukarma that such Gelatin which has been derived from the Pig tissues and skin is not permissible. On the other side Islamic Fiqha Academy, India has decided that all kind of Gelatin is permissible because of Istihala i.e. Its change from one thing into another thing in the light of the views of Imam Muhammad bin Hassan Alshibani in Raddul Muhtar Aala Durrul Mukhtar.
Governance networks are emerging as a prominent feature of contemporary public administration where different actors are in a position to exert power on public organizations exposing them to conflicting demands. Moreover, public organizations are exposed to contradictory institutional pressures as they try to attend to numerous and sometimes-conflicting prescriptions from different reform models. Whilst, the presence of contradictory institutional logics is well recognized, how organizations cope with the challenge of contradictory institutional logics remains under researched. A largely prevailing argument is that organizations indecisively conform to institutional pressures where new logic replaces the prior one. This argument provides an over simplified explanation of this complex phenomenon because organizations may use diverse strategies (and at-times hybrid responses) to incorporate multiple logics at the same time. Responding to this literature gap, this study addresses how public organizations experience and manage institutional complexity in the contemporary network arrangements in the public sector. This study uses a multi-level framework for analyzing institutional complexity incorporating macro-level sectoral reforms that present contradictory logics to organizations; the meso-level network characteristics that shape the complexity for the embedded organizations; and micro-level organizational attributes that enable them to handle complexity by choosing appropriate strategies. The study adopts an abductive research approach using case study research design taking Pakistan’s energy sector as the case; power network as the embedded unit (within the energy sector) for network analysis; and two public sector utilities (LESCO and IESCO) as embedded units within power network for organizational analysis. iii The study finds that diverse reform trajectories have exposed the energy sector to three competing institutional logics including traditional public administration (TPA) logic, new public management (NPM) logic and new public governance (NPG) logic, exposing the public organizations to institutional complexity. Additionally, under NPM-based fragmentation and NPG-based integration reforms, there is drastic shift in energy sector from vertically integrated bureaucracies to a web of autonomous organizations working in governance networks. Three notable characteristics of the power network are fragmentation, centralization and trust, which play a critical role in shaping the complexity for embedded organizations. The study finds that the embedded organizations (LESCO and IESCO) have incorporated multiple and conflicting institutional prescriptions through the strategies of differentiated hybridity (where diverse logics are addressed separately) and blended hybridity (where logics are blended for new solutions). In this regard, the critical attributes of organizations, that can enable them to better handle institutional complexity, include their task, leadership and governance structure. The study supports the argument of institutional logics perspective that the organizations actively incorporate multiple institutional pressures by developing hybrid solutions. This study contributes to existing literature by providing an explanation of how organizations respond varyingly to institutional pressures while choosing appropriate strategies. Moreover, it captures the emergence, structure and characteristics of governance networks in contemporary public administration in developing countries. It also delineates policy implications for the energy sector crises in Pakistan from a governance point of view.