قدیم سودی مالیاتی نظام کا تحقیقی جائزہ

Ontemporary modern interest-bearing financial system, “economicsystem”, has become an integral part and the prevalent system reflects that in the modern progressive era of growth where other arts have seen progress than in the old days the modern interest bearing system has become a part of the financial development. Interest in the present era has being understood as a direction for financial growth and development of economy hence in some way or the other been tried to be enforced in to the Islamic world such that it becomes a need and no country can live without. And the objectives of this interest bearing system can meet their targets. In Muslim countries minds that do not have deep commitment with Islamic teaching have been convinced in a way that in the ancient days this level of interest was not needed as in the present era. So, on the interest of present day “riba” can’t be applied whose prohibition is proved by Islamic law. The impression that interest is the need of modern times in ancient times to modern times thislevel of interest is not required, nor was there any specifically organized circle like today concept the financial system may be of interest not only if favor of contemporary practice in the present, but also an extremely ancient system was out there and have some evidence of old banking practices. This article, with the vividness of ancient religions, has proved that “interest” in antiquity is as same as of today. The form of interest and its impacts aren’t get changed by the change in ancient or current business practices. Interest is interest, whether it is found in ancient religions or at theadvent of Islam or even after that in the modern day. It embodies the same “riba” whose prohibition is proved in the Islamic sharia.

Pakistan Counterinsurgency Doctrine and Practice in Swat 2007-2015

The insurgency in Swat (2007 onwards) tested the ideological will of Pakistan and took a heavy toll of human life, both of civilian population and law enforcement personnel alike. The ranging course of hard way to peace in Swat is seen as natural consequence of the state’s failure in the form of bad governance, worsening social justice and deteriorating rule of law. The inability of government to devise a suitable legislation according to the needs of people led to the legal vacuum that was effectively exploited by reactionary forces. After the USSR’s eviction from Afghanistan, the Jihadists under Sufi Mohammad turned their attention towards Shariatization of Pakistan’s Swat region. In order to address the grievances of the people, the Nizam-e-Adl Regulations was imposed in 1994 and then, with some amendments, in 1999 but it failed being cosmetic in nature. The study attempts to explore the rise of insurgency in Swat in post 9/11 and Pakistan Counterinsurgency campaign which included both the kinetic operations (military approach) and non-kinetic operations (peace agreements, psychological and de-radicalization operations). The outcomes of this thesis reveal that Sharia’s cause may not have been a main driver of conflict in Swat, but the underdeveloped and outlandish judicial system and ineffective governance certainly led to the rise of Sufi Mohammad and Fazlullah as political force in the region. Taking advantage of the situation, the lower class such as peasants and tenants being socially and economically deprived joined the insurgency. Moreover, the peace agreements of 2007 and 2008 brought forth detrimental consequences, nonetheless, the 2009 peace deal in the form of Nizam-e-Adl Regulations was meaningful in nature, since it exposed the true face of militants before the people that their demand for Sharia enforcement was just an excuse to gain power. As far Pakistan Army was concerned, it was more inclined to remain a conventional Army capable of meeting any threat from India rather than to be seen as a counterinsurgency force. Military operations such as Rah-e-Haq I, II and III which were conducted from 2007 until 2009 failed due to various factors such as President Musharraf’s double standards, weak internal security policies, feeble political will, General Kayani’s indecisive military approach and lack of military training for Counterinsurgency operations. From tactical perspective, the major shortcoming of Rah-e-Haq I, II, III was military’s inability to launch successful ground operation inside Peochar valley. The findings of this thesis suggest that post April 2009 era, Pakistan military transformed its strategic culture from conventional into Counterinsurgency warfare as evident from various indicators: Massive training for guerilla operations, small mobile units operating within the population centers; settlement of the millions of displaced population, mobilization of community security through village defense committees, Lashkar and Aman committees. Over and above, Pakistan Military conducted the most challenging non-kinetic aspects of counterinsurgency; the de-radicalization. In Swat, Sabaoon is first de-radicalization center in the world for the children who had been plagued with extremists’ ideology, including those who were trained to become suicide bombers. In a nutshell, the research deconstructs Pakistan’s approach of countering the insurgency by probing both its military response as well as civilian response in the broader framework of integrated counterinsurgency approach.