The present research study analyzed the relationship of internal corporate governance mechanisms, corporate cash holdings and firm performance by taking the interplay of political connections and political environment. For the purpose, 150 non-financial Pakistani firms’ data ranging from 2001 to 2014 were employed, which was further split into sub samples based on dictator regime (2001-2007) and democratic regime (2008-2014), large and small size firms. The study employed both static and dynamic panel data models. Generally, and consistent with the prior researchers, the study documented that internal corporate governance mechanisms (board characteristics, CEO characteristics, audit committee features) are important predictors of a firm’s cash holdings and performance in Pakistani market. Theoretically, the findings from this study mainly supported the agency theory, resource dependency theory and stewardship theory. This study further investigated that whether the effect of internal corporate governance mechanisms on cash holdings and firm performance varies with firm size and political environment. Empirically, the results showed some statistical differences in the relationships in both dictator and democratic regime, large and small size sample firms. Moreover, the study investigated the relationship of internal corporate governance mechanisms with cash holdings and firm performance by considering the interplay of political connections. For this purpose, the study proposed two alternative effects that political connections had on internal corporate governance mechanisms, namely complementary and substitution effect. On average, the present study found complementary effect, indicated that considering both strong (weak) internal corporate governance mechanisms and political connections reduce (enhance) corporate cash holdings. In the same vein, for firm performance, political connections on average substitute internal corporate governance suggested that considering both strong (weak) internal corporate governance mechanisms and political connections decrease (increase) firm performance. These effects were changed when moved from dictator to democratic regime and large to small size sample firms.